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The Law of Directed Trustees Under
ERISA: A Proposed Blueprint
for the Federal Courts
Colleen E. MediZr
The dynamic asset growth necessary to meet its responsibilities
has placed the private pension system in a position to influence
the level ofsavings, the operation ofour capital markets, and the
relative financial security of millions of consumers, three of the
fundamental elements of our national economic security.!

Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"),2 the federal law governing private employer-sponsored employee
benefit plans,3 over twenty years ago. Since that time, private retirement plan
funds have become an even more dominant element of United States savings
and capital markets. In 1992, the most recent year for which data is available,

*

Member of the Missouri Bar; J.D., University of Kansas, 1989.
1. Statement ofthe House ofRepresentatives Committee on Education and Labor
regarding the need for the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. H.R.
REp. No. 93-533 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4640.
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at various sections of Titles 26 and 29 of the
United States Code [hereinafter "ERISA"]). ERISA's original section numbers were
changed when it was codified in Title 29 of the United States Code, which contains
the federal labor provisions. Additionally, portions of ERISA were codified in the
Internal Revenue Code, Title 26 of the United States Code. References to ERISA in
this article will be to the 1994 edition ofTitle 29 and, where applicable, to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
3. Employee benefit plans subject to ERISA include both welfare benefit plans
and pension benefit plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1994). Welfare benefit plans
provide medical, sickness, disability, death, unemployment, or vacation benefits,
training programs, day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal expenses. See
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994). Some types of welfare benefit plans, most notably those
providing medical benefits through a trust pursuant to section 501(c)(9) ofthe Internal
Revenue Code, hold plan assets in a trust. Pension benefit plans provide retirement
income to employees or result in a deferral of income by employees until the
termination of employment or beyond. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1994). Types
ofpension benefit plans for for-profit private employers include defined benefit plans,
profit sharing plans, cash or deferral arrangements (commonly known as "401(k)"
plans), money purchase pension plans, employee stock ownership plans, and executive
deferred compensation plans. ERISA requires that all pension benefit plans must hold
plan assets in a trust. See 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1994).
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The case law construing the definition of a fiduciary has focused
primarily on the discretionary functions with respect to plan management and
administration which qualify a person as an ERISA fiduciary.22 A person's
fiduciary status under the discretionary conduct part of the definition is
coterminous with the person's exercise of discretionary authority respecting
Thus, under the
the management or administration of the plan.23
discretionary prong of the definition, a person can be a fiduciary when
exercising the requisite discretionary authority, but may also be a nonfiduciary for other purposes.24 In contrast, under the plain language of the
definition, a person who exercises any authority or control (discretionary or
not) with respect to the management or disposition of plan assets is a
fiduciary.25

or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or
other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other
property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or
(iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the
administration of such plan....
Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994). This article does not address the duties
of fiduciary investment advisors referred to in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(ii) (1994).
22. See, e.g., Donovan v. Mercer, 747 F.2d 304, 308-09 (5th Cir. 1984) (exercise
of discretionary authority respecting plan management and disposition of plan assets
made party a fiduciary); Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 342 (6th Cir. 1988)
(holding union representative was a fiduciary because of exercise of discretionary
authority in influencing local unions to choose certain dental association); Pohl v.
National Ben. Consultants, 956 F.2d 126, 129 (7th Cir. 1992) ("ERISA makes the
existence of discretion a sine qua non of fiduciary duty"); O'Neil v. Davis, 721 F.
Supp. 1013, 1015 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (voting of shares held as plan assets is fiduciary act
of plan management).
23. See, e.g., Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v.
Corrigan, 793 F.2d 1456, 1459-60 (5th Cir. 1986) (person is a fiduciary only with
respect to those aspects of the plan over which he exercises authority or control);
Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 133-35 (7th Cir. 1984) (defendants were fiduciaries to
the extent they performed fiduciary functions); Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d 660, 669
(8th Cir. 1992) (ERISA fiduciary is liable only to the extent he exercises discretionary
control or has discretionary management authority).
24. See, e.g., Corrigan, 793 F.2d at 1459-60 (ERISA recognizes that a person
may be a fiduciary for some purposes and not others); Leigh, 727 F.2d at 133 (same).
25. See infra discussion and notes 94-95.
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are consistent with the provisions of ERISA. This duty requires a fiduciary
to not follow any terms of the plan which are contrary to ERISA.38
The statutory language does not address how the broad fiduciary duties
prescribed in ERISA section 404(a)(1) are to be reconciled with the narrow
duties of a directed trustee under ERISA section 403(a)(1). Judicial attempts
to interpret and apply section 404(a)(1) to directed trustees have resulted in
conflicting decisions concerning the fiduciary responsibilities of directed
trustees. 39

D. Section 405(a): Co-Fiduciary Liability
ERISA section 405(atO describes the circumstances under which a
fiduciary will be liable for a breach of duty by a co-fiduciary. Under ERISA
sections 405(a)(1) and (3), a fiduciary is liable if he has actual knowledge of
the breach by the co-fiduciary and knowingly participates in or undertakes to
conceal the breach, or fails to make reasonable efforts to remedy the breach.
Absent actual knowledge of the co-fiduciary's breach of duty, the fiduciary
will still be liable under ERISA section 405(a)(2) if he fails to comply with
his duties under ERISA section 404(a)(1) and thereby enables the co-fiduciary
to commit a breach of duty.
A directed trustee by definition under ERISA section 403(a)(1) always
acts at the direction of another plan fiduciary.41 Consequently, section 405(a)
would appear to be significant for purposes of determining the liability of a
directed trustee.

38. See authorities cited infra note 168.
39. See discussion infra Parts II.B & III.B.
40. The text of ERISA § 405(a) reads:
(a) In addition to any liability which he may have under any other
provisions of this part, a fiduciary with respect to a plan shall be liable for
a breach offiduciary responsibility of another fiduciary with respect to the
same plan in the following circumstances:
(1) ifhe participates knowingly in, or knowingly undertakes to
conceal, an act or omission of such other fiduciary, knowing such act
or omission is a breach;
(2) if, by his failure to comply with section 404(a)(I) in the
administration of his specific responsibilities which give rise to his
status as a fiduciary, he has enabled such other fiduciary to commit a
breach; or
(3) if he has knowledge of a breach by such other fiduciary,
unless he makes reasonable efforts under the circumstances to remedy
the breach.
Codified at 29 U.S.C. § l105(a) (1994).
41. See 29 U.S.C. § l103(a)(I) (1994).
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E. Section 409(a): Fiduciary Liability
ERISA section 409(a) makes a fiduciary personally liable to restore to the
plan: (1) any losses resulting from the fiduciary's breach of his duties under
ERISA; or (2) any profits ofthe fiduciary made through the use of plan assets
by the fiduciary.42 ERISA section 409(a) also authorizes any other equitable
or remedial relief as the court deems appropriate, such as the removal of the
fiduciary. ERISA section 409(a) does not authorize any sort of monetary
relief to a party other than the plan, such as an individual damage award to a
plan participant.43
ERISA section 409(a) is significant in the directed trustee context for two
reasons. First, this section establishes the personal liability of the directed
trustee for a breach of fiduciary duty. Second, this section, along with ERISA
section 502(a), reflects the practical significance of the status of a directed
trustee as a fiduciary under ERISA. If a directed trustee is a fiduciary, the
plan may recover against the directed trustee personally for losses incurred or
profits obtained through a breach of fiduciary duty. Conversely, if a directed
trustee is not a fiduciary, the plan may not recover against the directed trustee
any losses incurred or profits obtained through the directed trustee's
misconduct.

F. Section 502(a): Civil Enforcement Actions
ERISA section 502(a) authorizes specific types of civil causes of actions
which may be brought under ERISA. 44 There are no "implied" civil causes

42. The text of ERISA § 409(a) reads in relevant part:
(a) Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any
of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by
this title shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to
the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any
profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets ofthe
plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or
remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of
such fiduciary.
Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1994).
43. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 139-42
(1985).
44. The text of ERISA § 502(a) reads in relevant part:
(a) A civil action may be brought(1) by a participant or beneficiary(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary
for appropriate relief under section 409;
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of actions outside of the statutory civil actions recognized under ERISA
section 502(a).4S Furthermore, ERISA preempts claims based on state laws
or regulations.46 Consequently, if a plan participant cannot fit his claim into
one ofERISA's statutory causes ofactions discussed in section 502(a), he will
be left without a remedy under either federal or state law.47
ERISA sections 502(a)(2) and (3) are the most relevant civil enforcement
actions for purposes of directed trustees. Section 502(a)(2) authorizes a plan
participant to bring a civil action against a fiduciary for appropriate plan-wide
relief under ERISA section 409(a).48 ERISA section 502(a)(3) is a "catchall" provision49 authorizing a plan participant to bring a civil action to enjoin
any act or practice in violation of the term of the plan or ERISA, or to obtain
other appropriate equitable relief. so
Section 502(a) is significant in the directed trustee context principally
because it represents the consequences of a determination that a directed
trustee is a fiduciary under ERISA. A "fiduciary" directed trustee may be
sued by a plan participant, either on behalf of the plan under ERISA section
502(a)(2)SI or, individually, under ERISA section 502(a)(3),s2 for a breach
of fiduciary duty. If, however, the court rules that the directed trustee is not
a fiduciary, the plan participant is without a cause of action under ERISA and
any state laws claims are preempted-in short, the plan participant has no
recourse against the directed trustee. This significant consequence appears to
have been overlooked in judicial decisions holding that a directed trustee is
not a fiduciary.s3

(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any
act or practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms
of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions ofthis title or
the terms of this plan.
Codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1994).
45. See Russell, 473 U.S. at 146-48.
46. See authorities discussed supra note 13.
47. This result, known as "betrayal without a remedy," is a common phenomenon
in ERISA litigation. See, e.g., Betrayal Without Remedy-Part VII: The Recent Non3rd Circuit Decisions, 3 ERISA Lit. Rep. No.3, 9-17 (1994) (seventh article in an
ongoing series discussing "betrayal without a remedy" cases).
48. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (1994).
49. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1075 (1996).
50. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1994).
51. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146-48
(1985).
52. See Varity Corp., 116 S. Ct. at 1075.
53. See infra note 84 and text accompanying notes 87-89.
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DIRECTED TRUSTEES

Cases addressing the duties of directed trustees under ERISA are sparse.
Two major early cases in the directed trustee area are Newton v. Van
Otter/oo54 and Ershick v. United Missouri Bank. 55 In both of these cases
the courts assumed, without discussion of the issue, that the directed trustee
was a "fiduciary" under ERISA. The court's analysis in each of these early
decisions focused on the degree of deference the directed trustee must give to
the direction provided to the directed trustee by another plan fiduciary who
was not a plan participant. In each instance the court ruled that, absent actual
knowledge on the part of the directed trustee that the direction was a breach
of duty by the directing fiduciary, the directed trustee was entitled to rely
upon the direction and was not liable for carrying out the instructions of the
directing fiduciary.
Two recent Eighth Circuit decisions, FirsTier Bank v. Ze//er 6 and
Maniace v. Commerce Bank,57 have created confusion concerning the
principles established by the early cases. These Eighth Circuit decisions have
reached opposite conclusions on two fundamental issues concerning directed
trustees: (1) the status of a directed trustee as a fiduciary for purposes of
ERISA; and (2) the degree of deference the directed trustee must give to the
direction. The language used by the Eighth Circuit in these decisions
illustrates the need for a thorough analysis and clarification of the law of
directed trustees under ERISA which is grounded in ERISA's statutory
language, legislative history, and the remedial purposes underlying the statute.

A. The Early Directed Trustee Cases
1. Newton v. Van Otterloo
Newton v. Van Otter/oo5S addressed the duty of a directed trustee with
respect to voting directions for the election of corporate directors. The case
has enormous practical significance because it represents a situation often
encountered by directed trustees ofemployee stock ownership plans ("ESOPs")
holding as the primary plan asset the stock of a non-publicly traded company.
In Newton, the ESOP held eighty-one percent of the company's
outstanding stock. Under the terms of the ESOP the plan participants were
permitted to vote directly the shares of stock allocated to their accounts for the

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

756 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Ind. 1991).
948 F.2d 660 (10th Cir. 1991).
16 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 194 (1994).
40 F.3d 264 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1964 (1995).
756 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Ind. 1991).
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election of corporate directors. The ESOP committee was the named fiduciary
responsible for directing the trustee how to vote the remaining unallocated
shares. The unallocated shares controlled by the ESOP committee represented
nearly seventy percent of the outstanding stock of the company. The
participants' allocated shares represented a little more than eleven percent of
the outstanding stock. The company's president personally owned eighteen
percent of the company's stock outside of the ESOP and the remaining one
percent was held by 11 other individuals.
The ESOP committee consisted of five members. Two members were
hourly union employees and three members were management employees,
consisting of the chief financial officer, the personnel manager, and the
personnel manager's secretary. The president of the company, whose
management was being challenged by the union, recommended that the ESOP
committee abstain from voting the unallocated ESOP shares and any allocated
shares not voted by participants for the election of corporate directors. The
ESOP committee followed this recommendation and ordered the ESOP
directed trustee to abstain from voting the unallocated and allocated but not
voted shares. The directed trustee followed the direction to abstain from
voting the shares.59 As a result, the incumbent management slate of
directors, which included the president, was reelected on the strength of the
president's personal share ownership of eighteen percent of the outstanding
stock of the company.
Four ESOP participants sued the management members of the ESOP
committee and the president, alleging that they manipulated the voting of the
ESOP share to retain incumbent management. The participants claimed that
the management members of the ESOP committee were interested in
preserving their management jobs and thus had a conflict of interest that
prevented them from fulfilling their fiduciary duties to the ESOP participants.
The ESOP participants also sued the ESOP directed trustee, alleging that the
directed trustee violated its fiduciary duties under ERISA section 404(a)(I)
and was liable as a co-fiduciary under ERISA section 405(a) for participating
in the committee's breach of fiduciary duty by following the direction to
abstain from voting the shares.
The court did not question the premise underlying the participant's claims
against the directed trustee under ERISA sections 404(a)(I) and 405(a)-that
the directed trustee was a fiduciary. Instead, the court focused on the
standards for a directed trustee under ERISA section 403(a)(I), namely that
the directed trustee "ordinarily is bound to carry out instructions from a plan's
named fiduciaries, but only if the instructions are proper and are not contrary
to ERISA."60 The participants argued that the committee's direction to

59. See id at 1132.
60. [d.
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abstain from voting nearly seventy percent of the company's stock was so
unusual that the directed trustee should not have followed the ESOP
committee's direction.
The court rejected the participants' claim, relying on the narrow standard
of ERISA section 403(a)(l). The court found that the terms of the plan gave
the ESOP committee discretion to decide how to vote the unallocated shares,
and that a decision to abstain was within this discretionary power. Therefore,
the direction to the directed trustee to abstain on its face was in accordance
with the terms of the plan. The more difficult question addressed by the court
was whether, under these circumstances, the direction to abstain was contrary
to ERISA due to the apparent conflict of interest on the part of the
management members of the ESOP committee. Here the court relied on the
earlier part of its opinion, which found that the management committee
members with divided loyalties nevertheless could have directed the trustee to
vote or abstain from voting the shares if, after an "independent and scrupulous
investigation" of their options, the management members determined that the
direction to abstain was in the best interests of the plan participants. The
incumbent management members of the management members of the
committee had not conducted such an investigation. The court found that this
failure on the part ofthe management members ofthe committee was not fatal
to the directed trustee. Rather, the court reasoned, had the ESOP committee
conducted such an investigation, the direction to abstain would not have been
contrary to ERISA. Significantly, the court did not impose upon the directed
trustee a duty to ask the committee if the committee had, in fact, conducted
such an investigation. Instead, the court ruled that because the directed trustee
lacked actual knowledge that the ESOP committee did not conduct the proper
investigation, the directed trustee was bound by the plan document and ERISA
section 403(a)(1) to follow the committee's direction. Therefore, the court
concluded, there was no basis upon which the directed trustee could be held
liable for a violation of ERISA. 61

2. Ershick v. United Missouri Bank
Ershick v. United Missouri Ban!!,2 is significant because it involved a
claim against a directed trustee for following a direction concerning the
purchase and sale of plan assets. The directed trustee in Ershick again was the
trustee of an ESOP established for the employees of a privately-held company.
The plan documents stated that the ESOP' was intended to be invested
primarily in company stock and expressly permitted investment of up to 100%

61. Id. at 1132-33.
62. 948 F.2d 660 (10th Cir. 1991).
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of the ESOP funds in company stock.63 Under the terms of the plan
document, the company served as the plan administrator with the express
power to direct the trustee "with regard to purchases of Company stock and
the fair market value thereof. ,,64 The plan document also stated that one of
the duties of the directed trustee was to invest any or all of the ESOP funds
in company stock, but that all purchases and sales of company stock must be
made only at the direction of the plan administrator, who would be responsible
for determining the terms for such purchases at prices that, in the· best
judgment of the administrator, did not exceed fair market value. 65
The company prospered until the death of its founder in 1981.
Thereafter, the fortunes of the company declined precipitously under the
direction of the new chief executive officer. While the company fortunes
were declining, the bank serving as the ESOP's directed trustee and as a
lender to the company, lowered the company's borrowing limit in response to
the company's declining financial situation. At the direction of the company
the ESOP directed trustee purchased 410 shares of company stock in 1983 at
a price of $300 per share and 899 shares in 1984 at a price of $285 per share.
These purchases made the ESOP the majority stockholder of the company,
effectively consolidating control of the company in incumbent management.
Before carrying out each of these purchase directives, the ESOP directed
trustee first ascertained that the stock purchase price was supported by a
current appraisal performed by an independent appraiser who was not
affiliated with the company.
The plaintiffs in the case were former company employees who were
fully vested ESOP participants. Upon learning that in 1986 that their ESOP
account balances (consisting almost entirely of company stock) had declined
to seventy-five percent of their former values, the former employees sued the
ESOP directed trustee, claiming that it had violated the prudence requirement
of ERISA section 404(a)(1)(B) by continuing to invest in company stock in
1983 and 1984 when the financial condition of the company was deteriorating.
The plaintiffs also claimed that the directed trustee should have attempted to
sell some or all of the company stock held by the ESOP once the bank's
commercial lending department had learned of the declining financial position
of the company and in response lowered the company's borrowing limit.
As in Newton v. Van Otterloo, the court accepted the underlying premise
of the plaintiffs' claim that the directed trustee was a fiduciary and therefore
was subject to the fiduciary duties described in ERISA section 404(a)(1). And

63. ERISA § 404(a)(2), codified at 29 U.S.C. § l104(a)(2) (1994), expressly
exempts employee stock ownership plans from the prudent diversification requirements
of ERISA § 404(a)(I)(C), codified at 29 U.S.C. § l104(a)(I)(C) (1994).
64. Ershick, 948 F.2d at 662-63.
65. Id. at 663.
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again, just like the court in Newton v. Van Otter/oo, the Ershick court relied
on the more narrow duties of a directed trustee under ERISA section
403(a)(1). The Ershick court ruled that the purchase directions to the ESOP
trustee were made in accordance with the terms of the plan and were not
contrary to ERISA, and concluded that the directed trustee was not liable for
following the directions to purchase company stock. A key factual finding
relied upon by the Ershick court was a lack of evidence that the directed
trustee had actual knowledge of the mismanagement of the company by the
new chief executive officer at the time the purchase directions were given.66
The court also relied on the lower court's factual finding that a "Chinese wall"
between the bank's commercial lending and trust departments prevented the
commercial loan department from communicating the company's poor loan
performance to the trust department. 67 The court suggested that this Chinese
wall prevented the directed trustee (in reality the trust department of the bank)
from having access to company fmancial information that would have
prompted the directed trustee to question the direction to purchase company
stock. The court's opinion did not address what, if any, duty the directed
trustee would have under ERISA had the trust department had actual
knowledge of the company's declining financial situation.
3. Fundamental Principles Established By The Early Cases
Newton and Ershickrecognized several fundamental principles governing
directed trustees under ERISA. First, directed trustees were assumed to be
fiduciaries under ERISA, and, therefore, were subject to fiduciary duties and
liability under ERISA. Second, although the relationships among the relevant
statutory sources of such fiduciary duties and liabilities, ERISA sections
403(a)(1), 404(a)(1), and 405(a), had not been clearly articulated, it appeared
that, in the context where the direction was made by another plan fiduciary,
the courts viewed the narrow duties of the directed trustee under ERISA
section 403(a)(1) as controlling over the general fiduciary duties described in
ERISA section 404(a)(1). As a result, if the direction given to the directed
trustee by the named plan fiduciary on its face was in accordance with the
terms of the plan and was not contrary to ERISA, the directed trustee did not
have a duty to inquire beyond the facially valid direction and would not be
held liable for following the direction. If, however, the directed trustee had
actual know/edge that the direction was a breach of duty by the directing
fiduciary, the directed trustee would be held liable for following the direction.
These fundamental principles, although not always favorable to the
participants, had the virtue of providing relatively clear rules that could be

66. lei. at 667-68.
67. lei. at 665.
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readily ascertained and applied by directed trustees. These "bright line" rules
subsequently have been blurred by the apparently contradictory twin Eighth
Circuit decisions of FirsTier Bank v. Zeller and Maniace v. Commerce Bank.

B. Recent Case Law Developments
1. FirsTier Bank v. Zeller
As in Ershick, the bank, acting as directed trustee in FirsTier Bank v.
Zeller,68 was both a lender to the company and the trustee of the company's
profit sharing plan. The company, deeply in debt and in a precarious financial
condition, lacked the cash to meet a $600,000 loan repayment to the bank.
After exhausting all possible sources of cash, the company still needed
$100,000 to repay the loan. Four days before the loan payment was due, the
company's president had the board of directors remove the bank as trustee and
substitute the president of the company as trustee of the profit sharing plan.
Once installed as trustee, the company president intended to remove the cash
held in the profit sharing plan participant accounts and substitute annuities.
The bank trustee advised the president that the annuity substitution proposal
was impermissible. The trustee also refused to accept its removal as trustee
because the bank officer in charge knew of the company's heavy indebtedness
and feared misuse of the profit sharing plan assets by the company
president.69
A few days later, the company's president met with the profit sharing
plan participants and persuaded them that the company would fail unless the
participants borrowed the cash from their individual plan accounts and
reloaned the money to the company. The company president then wrote to the
trustee and directed the trustee to make loans to each plan participant pursuant
to the terms of the plan, which provided that the "Trustee may, and shall at
the direction of the Company, make a loan or loans to a Participant." The
trustee promptly prepared the plan loan documents, obtained the signatures of
the individual plan participants on installment notes secured by their interests
in the plan, and disbursed loan proceeds totaling $93,950 to the individual
plan participants.70
The participants each transferred their loan proceeds to the president's
personal account at another bank, receiving in return promissory notes from
the company and the president. The president then wrote a $240,000 check
on his personal account to the company, which used the money to repay the
loan to the bank trustee. Shortly thereafter, the company went into bankruptcy

68. 16 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1993).
69. Id at 909.
70. Id at 910.

SCOIT ON TRUSTS § 185, at 574 (4th ed. 1987)).

RISA statutory sections omitted).

at 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(I)(B) (1994).

uld
have been left without any possible remedy.
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The obligations of a directed trustee are something less than that owed by
typical fiduciaries. [The directed trustee] was not required to weigh the
merits of an investment in [company] stock against all other investment
options every time it was directed to purchase said stock by the Committee.
Section [403(a)(I)] establishes the standard to be followed by directed
trustees, and under the present facts it cannot be said that the purchase of
[company] stock violated the Plan or was contrary to ERISA. 8s

The Maniace court's analysis implies a rejection of FirsTier Bank's
incorporation of the directed trustee's common law duty of reasonable inquiry
into ERISA. The Maniace court's analysis also represents a return to the
fundamental principles of Newton and Ershick. The Maniace court
acknowledged the conflict with its FirsTier Bank decision, but attempted to
distinguish FirsTier Bank on the ground that the directed trustee of the profit
sharing plan in FirsTier Bank had investment authority for all plan assets,
whereas the Maniace directed trustee did not have investment authority with
respect to the major asset of the ESOP, the company stock. 86 The Maniace
court added to the confusion by stating that it was "reaffirming" its ruling in
FirsTier Bank that ERISA section 403(a)(1) modified, but did not eliminate,
the directed trustee's duty of prudence under ERISA section 404(a)(I)(B).
The alternative, more probable reading of FirsTier Bank is that the court
rejected ERISA section 403(a)(1) as a potential limitation upon the general
fiduciary duties outlined in ERISA section 404(a)(1) when applied to a
directed trustee.

3. FirsTier Bank And Maniace: Double Trouble For The Future
Both FirsTier Bank and Maniace appear to contain fundamental errors
which, if not corrected by subsequent federal court decisions, wiJI result in
federal case law on the duties of directed trustees that is contrary to ERISA's
carefully crafted statutory scheme, its legislative history, and the remedial
purposes underlying the statute. These fundamental errors lie in two key
areas: (1) the status of a directed trustee as an ERISA fiduciary; and (2) the
nature of the duties of a directed trustee under ERISA and the degree of
deference the directed trustee must afford the directions given to him.
If a directed trustee is not a fiduciary under ERISA section 3(21)(A), as
found by the Maniace court, the ramifications of this determination run
throughout the statute. A "nonfiduciary" directed trustee cannot be subject to
the fiduciary standards of ERISA section 404(a)(I) because these duties only

85. Maniace, 40 F.3d at 268 (citing Ershick v. United Missouri Bank, 948 F.2d
660, 665 (lOth Cir. 1991)).
86. Id
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apply to afiduciary.87 Moreover, if a directed trustee is not a fiduciary, then
the directed trustee cannot be held personally liable under ERISA section
409(a) for his own breach of duty or vicariously liable for a breach of duty
by the directing fiduciary under ERISA section 405 because, again, these
sections only apply to afiduciary.88 Finally, if the directed trustee is not a
fiduciary, then the plan participants who are injured by the directed trustee's
conduct may be without a remedy under ERISA because ERISA section
502(a) does not permit a civil action against a nonfiduciary.89
The consequences resulting from FirsTier Bank's incorporation into
ERISA of principles developed under the common law of trusts are more
subtle, but of equal significance. Imposing the common law duty of
independent inquiry upon a directed trustee when the direction is given by
another plan fiduciary undermines ERISA's carefully crafted statutory scheme
In addition, the
allocating fiduciary responsibilities and liabilities.90
imposition of the common law duty of independent inquiry upon the directed
trustee sets up an unnecessary dichotomy in the responsibilities of the directed
trustee depending upon whether the direction is given by the named fiduciary
or the named fiduciary's designated investment manager. 91 These results are
contrary to the legislative history of ERISA describing the role of a directed
trustee vis-a.-vis the other plan fiduciaries. 92 FirsTier Bank's incorporation
into ERISA of the common law rule that a directed trustee has no duty of
independent inquiry when the direction is given by a trust beneficiary is
equally unsatisfactory in the ERISA plan context. Such a rule provides no
protection to the plan participants in situations where they are potentially
vulnerable to coercion by their employer who sponsors the plan. 93 This
danger is particularly acute when the plan holds as an asset shares of company
stock.
The confusion evidenced by the Eighth Circuit's decisions in FirsTier
Bank and Maniace appears to result from the lack of a cohesive theory of the
role of a directed trustee within ERISA's statutory scheme. Part III of this
article attempts to fill this intellectual void by analyzing the two key issues
upon which FirsTier Bank and Maniace reached opposite conclusions.

87. See text of ERISA § 404(a)(I), quoted supra note 32.
88. See text of ERISA § 409(a), quoted supra note 42; text of ERISA § 405(a),
quoted supra note 40.
89. See infra discussion and notes 102-08.
90. See infra discussion and notes 158, 162-65.
91. See discussion infra Part III.B.5.
92. See discussion infra Part IILB.2.
93. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
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KEy ISSUES RAISED BY

F/RST/ER BANK AND MAN/ACE

A. Fiduciary Status of a Directed Trustee Under ERISA
Contrary to the decision in Maniace v. Commerce Bank, a directed trustee
is always a fiduciary under ERISA. This conclusion is supported by the plain
language of ERISA section 3(2l)(A), the legislative history, and by the
purposes underlying the statute.
Under ERISA section 3(21)(A)(i), discretionary authority is clearly not
required for fiduciary status. ERISA section 3(2l)(A)(i) reads:
[a] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises
any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management
of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management
or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or
other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other
property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or
(iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the
administration of such plan....94

Although the first part of ERISA section 3(2l)(A)(i) refers to
discretionary authority or control, the second part of ERISA section
3(21)(A)(i) defines a person as a fiduciary if he "exercises any authority or
control respecting management or disposition of [the plan's] assets." By
virtue of the directed trustee's position as trustee of the trust holding the plan
assets, the trustee possesses the prerequisite authority or control over the plan
assets necessary to satisfy the defmition. 95
The few referencesto directed trustees in the legislative history ofERISA
are consistent with this interpretation that a directed trustee lacking
discretionary authority is nevertheless a fiduciary for purposes ofERISA. The

94. Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
95. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S.
86, 95-96 (1993) (emphasizing that under ERISA's definition of a fiduciary, any
exercise of authority or control gives rise to fiduciary status); 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8,
D-3, Q&A (1995) (some offices or positions of an employee benefit plan by their very
nature require persons who hold them to perform one or more of the functions
described in Section 3(21)(A»; AFL-CIO Letter, supra note 28, at 2330 (emphasizing
that in the context of a directed trustee of an ESOP, any exercise of authority or
control respecting the management or disposition of ESOP assets was a fiduciary
action under ERISA § 3(21»; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
LAW, 266-67 (1991) (position of trustee is necessarily a fiduciary one) [hereinafter
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW].
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House Conference Report accompanying ERISA discusses the duties of
directed trustees under the section entitled "Fiduciary Responsibility."96
There is no indication that the conferees contemplated excluding directed
trustees as fiduciaries.
The conclusion reached by the Maniace court-that a directed trustee is
not a fiduciary-would leave the plan participants without a remedy against
a wrong-doing trustee who misused plan assets. 97 Such a result would be
absurd in light of the well-documented past abuses by plan trustees which
prompted the passage of ERISA. 98 This result, which would be directly
contrary to the remedial purpose of protecting plan participants underlying the
statute,99 is a product of ERISA's civil enforcement scheme under ERISA
section 502(a). Under ERISA's civil enforcement scheme, any claim by the
plan participants against the directed trustee must satisfy one of ERISA section
502(a)'s statutory causes of actions. IOO ERISA section 502(a) does not
authorize a participant to bring a civil cause of action against a nonjiduciary.101 The civil actions listed in ERISA section 502(a) are the only
possible avenues for relief for a participant under ERISA. 102 Therefore, if
a directed trustee is not a fiduciary, a participant cannot bring a claim against
the directed trustee based on the directed trustee's personal liability for breach
of fiduciary duty under ERISA, and any state law-based claims would be
preempted. 103
Assuming still that a directed trustee is not a fiduciary, the other possible
relief for injured participants would be to bring a claim against the directed
trustee for aiding a breach of duty by the directing fiduciary. Prior to the

96. See H.R. CONF. REp. No. 93-1280 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5038, 5075, 5079, 5082-83.
97. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
98. See H.R. REp. No. 93-533 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 464043; S. REp. No. 93-127 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4839-44; see also
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 95, at 609 (major weakness of prior pension
plan legislation prior to ERISA was the absence of a private right of action for plan
participants).
99. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994) (policy of ERISA is to protect the interests
of plan participants and provide appropriate remedies, sanctions and ready access to
federal courts).
100. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994).
101. See text of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), quoted supra note 44.
102. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146-48
(1985) (rejecting implied private right of action for extra contractual damages under
ERISA and holding that the carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in
ERISA § 502(a) are the only remedies available under ERISA).
103. See authorities cited supra note 13.
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Supreme Court's decision in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,l04 the circuit
courts of appeals were divided over whether ERISA section S02(a)(3)
permitted a cause of action against a non-fiduciary for aiding a breach of duty
by a fiduciary. IDS Since the Mertens decision, however, every federal circuit
court of appeals addressing the issue has held that ERISA section 502 does not
authorize a private cause of action by a plan participant against a nonfiduciary.l06 Thus, an interpretation that a directed trustee is not a fiduciary
would bar any monetary recovery by the plan or plan participants against the
directed trustee for breach of his responsibilities under ERISA. lo7 Such an
outcome would be directly contrary to ERISA's stated goal of providing

104. 508 U.S. 248 (1993). In Mertens, the Supreme Court did not specifically
address the issue ofwhether a cause ofaction existed under ERISA § 502(a)(3) against
a non-fiduciary for aiding a breach of duty by a fiduciary. The question upon which
certiorari was granted was whether legal damages were available as a remedy under
ERISA § 502(a)(3). The Supreme Court assumed arguendo that a non-fiduciary could
be sued for knowingly participating in a breach of duty by a fiduciary under ERISA
§ 502(a)(3), and held that any remedy available for such a claim must be limited to
traditional equitable relief, not legal damages. Dicta in the Mertens opinion indicated
that the Supreme Court did not believe that ERISA permitted any type ofclaim against
a non-fiduciary. See id. at 253-54. The Supreme Court has subsequently cited
Mertens in a non-ERISA case as rejecting non-fiduciary liability. See Central Bank
of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1447 (1994).
105. Prior to Mertens the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and District of Columbia
Circuits appeared to recognize a private cause of action under ERISA § 502(a)(3)
against a non-fiduciary for aiding a breach of duty by a fiduciary. See Pappas v. Buck
Consultants, Inc., 923 F.2d 531,541-42 (7th Cir. 1991) (rejecting cause of action for
failure to plead necessary elements); Whitfield v. Lindemann, 853 F.2d 1298, 1303
(5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, Klepak v. Dole, 490 U.S. 1089 (1989); Brock v.
Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339,342 (6th Cir. 1988); Lowen v. Tower Asset Management,
Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1220 (2d Cir. 1987); Fink v. National Say. and Trust Co., 772
F.2d 951, 955, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits had rejected
a private cause of action under ERISA against a non-fiduciary. See Nieto v. Ecker,
845 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1988); Useden v. Acker, 947 F.2d 1563, 1582 (11th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 959 (1993).
106. See Reich v. Compton, 57 F.3d 270,284 (3d Cir. 1995); Reich v. Rowe,
20 F.3d 25, 29-35 (1st Cir. 1994); Reich v. Continental Cas. Co., 33 F.3d 754, 757-58
(7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1104 (1995).
107. A participant still arguably could bring a suit to enjoin any "act or practice"
by a non-fiduciary directed trustee which violated the terms ofthe plan or ERISA. See
ERISA § 502(a)(3), codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (1994); Useden,
947 F.2d at 1581. A nonfiduciary directed trustee would not be personally liable,
however, for restoring any losses to the plan or ill-gotten profits resulting from a
breach of duty. See ERISA § 409(a), quoted supra note 42; Useden, 947 F.2d at
1581-82 (liability under ERISA § 409(a) limited to fiduciaries).
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appropriate remedies and access to the federal courts for injured plan
participants. 108

B. The Directed Trustee's Duty of
Independent Inquiry Under ERISA
ERISA was designed to incorporate the principles of fiduciary conduct
developed under the common law oftrusts, but with modifications appropriate
for employee benefit plans. 109 The appropriate starting point for an analysis
of the duties of a directed trustee is ERISA section 403(a)(I), which states:
[If] the plan expressly provides that the trustee or trustees are subject to the
direction of a named fiduciary who is not a trustee, ... [then] the trustees
shall be subject to proper directions of such fiduciary which are made in
accordance with the terms of the plan and which are not contrary to this
Act. JJO

The above-quoted statutory language is capable of two competing
interpretations regarding the scope of the directed trustee's duty to determine
if the direction is in accordance with the terms of the plan and is not contrary
to ERISA. One possible interpretation is that the direction is "proper" and
thus the directed trustee must follow the direction if the direction on its face
is in accordance with the terms of the plan and is not contrary to ERISA.
Another possible interpretation is that in addition to determining that the
direction on its face is consistent with the terms of the plan and is not contrary
to ERISA, the directed trustee has a duty of reasonable care (hereinafter
referred to as the trustee's "duty of independent inquiry") to independently
inquire and determine that the direction is a "proper" one for the directing
fiduciary to make pursuant to the directing fiduciary's duties under ERISA.
Under this interpretation, the directed trustee would be liable for breach of
fiduciary duty under ERISA for following a facially valid direction if he
"should have known" that the directing fiduciary violated his duties as a
fiduciary under ERISA in issuing the direction.
The significance of whether a directed trustee has a duty of independent
inquiry with respect to a direction given by another plan fiduciary is
highlighted by the following example. Assume ABC Company sponsors a
pension plan for its employees (the "Plan"). The assets of the Plan are held
in trust by Trust Company. Under the terms of the Plan, Trust Company is
a directed trustee subject to the directions of the Plan's Administrative

108. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994).
109. See supra note 33.
110. Codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a){l) (1994).

Part
III.B.1.

TT &
FRATCHER, supra note 113, § 224.3 at 411.
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trustees to prevent a co-trustee from committing a breach of trust. I IS Where
the person directing the trustee was a fiduciary, under the common law of
trusts the directed trustee was not entitled to rely blindly on the direction.
Rather, the directed trustee was liable for following the direction if he knew
or should have known that the directing fiduciary was violating his duties in
issuing the direction. Thus, under the common law oftrusts, a directed trustee
had a duty to reasonably inquire and independently investigate to determine
whether the directing fiduciary was violating his duties to the trust
beneficiaries in making the direction. 1I6
The directed trustee was not subject to a duty of reasonable independent
inquiry under the common law of trusts when the person giving the direction
was a beneficiary of the trust acting only on his own behalf. In such a
situation, the directed trustee's only duty was to ascertain whether the
direction was in accordance with the terms of the trust and, if so, to follow the
direction. 1I7
2. Legislative History Regarding The Directed
Trustee's Duty Of Independent Inquiry
Shortly after Congress enacted ERISA, trust law practitioners debated
whether the directed trustee's duty of independent inquiry under the common
law of trusts had been incorporated into ERISA. lIB These discussions,
which predated any judicial decisions on the issue, generally discounted
relevant portions of ERISA's legislative history in arguing that the directed
trustee's duty of independent inquiry under the common law of trusts survived
under ERISA. ll9
The legislative history of ERISA describing the obligations of a directed
trustee under ERISA section 403(a)(1) appears to reject the common law duty

115. See2A SCOTT &FRATCHER, supra note 113, § 185 at 574 (directed trustee
is under a duty similar to duty owed to co-trustees); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 184 (1959) (describing co-trustee duty of reasonable care) and § 185 cmt.
e (directed trustee has duty similar to co-trustee's duty of reasonable care).
116. See Directed Trusts, supra note 10, at 537; Responsibility ofTrustee Where
Investment Power Is Shared Or Exercised By Others, 9 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
517, 521 (1974); 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 113, § 185, at 574-75;
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 185 emts. d & e (1959).
117. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 185 emt. d (1959); 2A SCOTT
& FRATCHER, supra note 113, § 185 at 574.
118. See Directed Trusts, supra note 10, at 546-550; Allen H. Merrill, Liability
for Breaches by Co-Fiduciaries, 31 Bus. LAW. 115, 120 (1975).
119. See Directed Trusts, supra note 10, at 546-47; Merrill, supra note 118, at
119-20.

of
following these instructions.").
122. AFL-CIO Letter, supra note 28.

er
securities).
131. See 29 C.F.R. § 25500404c-l(c)(2) (1995).
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exercise of shareholder rights by plan participants. l32 Thus, assuming the
substantial requirements of the regulations are satisfied, the PWBA's position
appears to be that the directed trustee is entitled to rely on the participant's
investment direction and is not subject to a duty of independent inquiry.133
An unresolved issue in the section 404(c) area is whether the directed trustee
is subject to a duty of independent inquiry with respect to the participant's
direction when some, but not all, of the requirements set forth in the
regulations pursuant to ERISA section 404(c) have been satisfied.
4. ERISA Section 405(b) Rejects A Duty Of Independent Inquiry
When The Direction Is Made By Another Plan Fiduciary
ERISA section 405(b), a section discussed in Part I of this article as
directly relevant to directed trustee issues, nevertheless provides some
indication that the directed trustee's common law duty of independent inquiry
was not incorporated into ERISA when the direction to the trustee is made by
another plan fiduciary. Section 405(b) provides that lIifthe assets of the plan
are held by two or more trustees, each shall use reasonable care to prevent a
co-trustee from committing a breach.II This subsection appears to incorporate
the duty of reasonable care for co-trustees developed under the common law
of trusts. 134 ERISA section 405(b), however, clearly excludes directed
trustees from this duty of reasonable care. First, the introductory language of
ERISA section 405(b) indicates that this section is to apply lIexcept as
provided in Section 403(a)(I),11 the section defining the duties of directed
trustees. Second, ERISA section 405(b)(3)(B) reemphasizes that lI[n]o trustee
shall be liable under this subsection for following instructions referred to in
Section 403(a)(I).11 Finally, ERISA section 405(b)'s duty of reasonable care
only applies if the directing fiduciary is a IItrustee. 1I By definition, however,
under ERISA section 403(a)(1), the directing fiduciary cannot be a

132.
133.
Georgia,
134.

See 29 C.F.R. § 2550A04c-l(d)2(ii)(E)(4)(ix) (1995).
Accord, Ronald S. Rizzo & James F. Carey, Reich v. NationsBank of
N.A., 4 ERISA Lit. Rep. No.4, 14, 18 (1995).
See discussion supra Part III.B.I.

t
intend to authorize remedy against nonfiduciary).
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5. Imposing a Duty of Independent Inquiry Upon the
Directed Trustee Creates an Unnecessary Distinction
in the Duties of the Directed Trustee
Viewing ERISA section 405(b) as rejecting a duty of independent inquiry
for directed trustees when the direction is made by a non-participant plan
fiduciary is consistent with ERISA's allocation offiduciary responsibilities and
liabilities, particularly when the directed trustee is subject to the investment
directions of a duly appointed "investment manager." Under ERISA section
402(c)(3),140 the named fiduciary of the plan may appoint an investment
manager to manage the assets of the plan. This allows the named fiduciary
to delegate to the investment manager the named fiduciary's responsibility
under ERISA section 402(a)(1y41 to manage the assets of the plan. If the
named fiduciary appoints an inve~tment manager, the liability of the directed
trustee for following the investment directions of the investment manager is
determined under ERISA section 405(d).142 ERISA section 405(d)(I)
provides:
If an investment manager or managers have been appointed under section
402(c)(3), then, notwithstanding subsections (a) (2) and (3) and subsection
(b), no trustee shall be liable for the acts or omissions of such investment
manager or managers, or be under an obligation to invest or otherwise
manage any asset of the plan which is subject to the management of such
investment manager .143

Thus under ERISA section 405(d)(1 ) the trustee does not have a duty of
independent inquiry with respect to the directions of the investment manager.
Reading ERISA section 405(b) as rejecting the common law duty of
independent inquiry for the directed trustee places the directed trustee in a
similar position regardless of whether the party providing the investment
direction is the named fiduciary or the named fiduciary's duly appointed
investment manager. A contrary interpretation creates an unnecessary
distinction in the duties of the directed trustee, depending upon whether the
party giving the direction is the named fiduciary or the named fiduciary's
investment manager.144

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Codified at 29 U.S.C.
Codified at 29 U.S.C.
Codified at 29 U.S.C.
Codified at 29 U.S.C.
AccordMerrill, supra

§ 1102(c)(3) (1994).
§ 1102(a)(1) (1994).
§ 1105(d) (1994).
§ 1105(d)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
note 118, at 120.
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This unnecessary distinction can be illustrated by example: Recall the
earlier example of ABC Company, which sponsors a pension plan for its
employees and has Trust Company as the directed trustee. In that example,
Trust Company was subject to the investment directions of the named plan
fiduciary, the Administrative Committee. Trust Company's dilemma in the
example was that if Trust Company was subject to the common law duty of
independent inquiry, it must independently determine that the direction to
invest twenty-five percent of the Plan's assets in High-Tech, Inc. stock was
not contrary to the Administrative Committee's fiduciary duties or ERISA's
other requirements. If Trust Company failed to take reasonable measures to
determine that the Administrative Committee's investment direction was not
contrary to its fiduciary duties, Trust Company would be liable for following
the facially valid investment direction if the Administrative Committee had
committed a breach of duty in issuing the investment direction and a loss to
the Plan resulted from the purchase of the High-Tech, Inc. stock.
Assume that instead of the Administrative Committee directing the Plan
investments itself, the Administrative Committee appoints Securities Brokers,
Inc. as an investment manager, pursuant to ERISA section 402(c)(3), to
manage the investment of the Plan's assets. Securities Brokers, Inc. issues the
exact same investment direction to Trust Company. What is the duty of Trust
Company with respect to the direction? Under ERISA section 405(d)(l),
Trust Company has no duty of independent inquiry with respect to the
direction and is not liable if the purchase of the High-Tech, Inc. stock results
in a loss to the Plan, irrespective of whether Securities Brokers, Inc. had acted
contrary to ERISA in issuing the direction.
As the above example illustrates, if the reference to a "proper" direction
in ERISA section 403(a)(1) is read as creating a duty of independent inquiry
for the directed trustee when acting at the direction of a non-participant plan
fiduciary, the directed trustee would act at his peril if he relied on a facially
valid investment direction issued by the named plan fiduciary. If, however,
the investment direction was made by an investment manager appointed to
manage the plan's assets on behalfof the named plan fiduciary, under ERISA
section 405(d)(1) the directed trustee would be absolved from liability if he
followed the exact same facially valid investment direction made by an
investment manager appointed by the named plan fiduciary.
The interpretation of ERISA section 403(a)(l) as not incorporating the
common law duty of independent inquiry with respect to a direction made by
a non-participant plan fiduciary avoids this unnecessary distinction in the
duties of the directed trustee. A parallel liability structure for a directed
trustee, regardless of whether the direction is from a named fiduciary or from
the named fiduciary's appointed investment manager, is consistent with the
report of the House and Senate Conference Committee ("Conference Report")
comparing the liability of the directed trustee when acting at the direction of
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the named plan fiduciary versus an investment manager. The Conference
Report states:
If the plan provides that the trustees are subject to the direction of named
fiduciaries, then the trustees are not to have the exclusive management and
control over the plan assets, but generally are to follow the directions ofthe
named fiduciary. Therefore, if the plan sponsor wants an investment
committee to direct plan investments, he may provide for such an
arrangement in the plan. In addition, since investment decisions are basic
to plan operations, members of such an investment committee are to be
named fiduciaries . . . If the plan so provides, the trustee who is directed
by an investment committee is to follow that committee's directions unless
it is clear on their face that the actions to be taken under those directions
would be prohibited by thefiduciary responsibility rules ofthe bill or would
be contrary to the terms ofthe plan or trust.
In addition . . ., to the extent that the management of plan assets is
delegated to a special category ofpersons called "investment managers",
the trustee is not to have exclusive discretion to manage and control the
plan assets, nor would the trustee be liable for any act ofsuch investment
manager. 14S

A contrary argument may be made that the clear exculpatory language of
ERISA section 405(d)(1) absolving the directed trustee from liability where
the direction is from an investment manager is evidence that Congress knew
how to protect a directed trustee from liability for following directions, but
chose to limit this protection to the investment manager context. 146 Thus,
section 405(d)(l) could be read as an indication that the directed trustee has
a duty of independent inquiry under ERISA with respect to the directions of
another plan fiduciary except in the investment manager context.
There are two countervailing reasons why ERISA section 405(d)(I)
should not be read as evidence that the directed trustee is subject to a duty of
independent inquiry except when the direction is made by an investment
manager. First, as a practical matter such an analysis sets up the possibility
that two fiduciaries-the directing fiduciary and the directed trustee-must
approve the direction. 147 Such a result is inconsistent with ERISA's
statutory scheme permitting the allocation of fiduciary responsibilities. 148
Such an interpretation also undermines the statute's careful balancing of

145. H.R. CONF. REp. No. 93-1280 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5038,5079 (emphasis added).
146. See Rizzo & Carey, supra note 133, at 19.
147. See Rizzo & Carey, supra note 133, at 19.
148. See discussion and authorities cited infra notes 158, 162-65.
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competing interests to avoid creating rules which are so costly to administer
that employers are discouraged from offering benefit plans to their
employees. 149 Quite simply, if directed trustees are required to assume the
full range of fiduciary responsibility and liability associated with the duty of
independent inquiry, they must increase the price oftheir services accordingly.
A second compelling reason for rejecting the common law duty of
independent inquiry when the directed trustee acts at the direction of a nonparticipant plan fiduciary is the plain language of ERISA section 405(b).
ERISA section 405(b) imposes the common law duty of independent inquiry
upon co-trustees. 150 ERISA section 405(b)(3)(B), however, expressly states
that "[n]o trustee shall be liable under this subsection for following
instructions referred to in ERISA section 403(a)(1)."151 This exclusion of
a directed trustee from liability under ERISA section 405(b) is meaningless if
the directed trustee is nevertheless subject to a duty of independent inquiry
under ERISA section 403(a)(I). A contrary interpretation would render the
exculpatory language of ERISA section 405(b)(3)(B) superfluous. 152
6. Conclusion
Under the common law of trusts, a directed trustee had a duty of
reasonable care to independently determine that the fiduciary directing the
trustee had not violated his duties to the trust beneficiaries in issuing the
direction. Although an argument could be made that the reference to a
"proper" direction in ERISA section 403(a)(I) incorporates the common law
duty of independent inquiry for directed trustees, the legislative history of
ERISA indicates that when the person directing the trustee is a non-participant
plan fiduciary, the directed trustee is entitled to rely on a facially valid
direction. The rejection of a duty of independent inquiry for a direction made
by a non-participant plan fiduciary is consistent with ERISA section 405(b),
which excludes directed trustees from liability for breach of duty of reasonable
care to prevent a breach of duty by a co-fiduciary. This express exclusion of
a directed trustee from a co-trustee's duty of reasonable care is significant
because the directed trustee's duty of independent inquiry under the common
law was based upon the co-trustee's duty of reasonable care. The conclusion
that ERISA section 403(a)(I) does not impose a duty of independent inquiry
upon the directed trustee when the direction is made by a non-participant plan
fiduciary also avoids creating an unnecessary distinction in the duties of the

149. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1070 (1996).
150. See discussion supra Part III.BA.
151. Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1105(b)(3)(B) (1994).
152. See discussion and authorities cited infra note 160.
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directed trustee depending upon whether the direction is made by the named
plan fiduciary or his duly appointed investment manager.
The statutory analysis of the meaning of a "proper" direction under
ERISA section 403(a)(1) becomes much less clear when the direction is made
by a plan participant solely for his own account. Under the common law of
trusts, if the person directing the trustee was a trust beneficiary acting solely
on his own behalf and not in a fiduciary capacity, the directed trustee did not
have a duty of independent inquiry and could rely on the direction if it was
in accordance with the terms of the trust. ERISA's standards and procedural
protections, however, are a reflection that the common law of trusts did not
always offer sufficient protection to plan participants. ls3 A strict application
of this common law rule in all situations pursuant to the reasoning of the
FirsTier Bank decision would leave plan participants vulnerable to unfair
voting procedures and the exercise of undue influence by their employer,
particularly in the context of participant directions involving employer
stock. 154 In other situations, such as participant-directed plan loans ISS or
participant-directed investments/ 56 the elaborate procedures governing the
participant's directions under ERISA arguably provide sufficient protection to
the participants so that imposing a duty of independent inquiry upon the
directed trustee is unnecessary. Such a determination necessarily will involve
a case-by-case analysis balancing ERISA's competing interests between
protecting plan participants and not creating a system that is so costly to
administer that employers are discouraged from offering benefit plans to their
employees. ls7
In summary, situations where the direction to the trustee is made by a
plan participant must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, bearing in mind
ERISA's underlying purposes and the safeguards created through the statute
and its implementing regulations. The analytical approach adopted in the
FirsTier Bank court decision, a literal incorporation of the common law of
trusts rules into the context of ERISA, is inappropriate because in some
situations more protection is needed for the plan participants than was afforded
by the common law of trusts. When the direction to the trustee is made by
a non-participant plan fiduciary, however, ERISA appears to reject the
common law duty of independent inquiry for directed trustees.

153. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1070 (1996).
154. See AFL-CIO Letter, supra note 28; CHH Letter, supra note 126; Polaroid
Letter, supra note 28; International Games Letter, supra note 28.
155. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550A08b-l (1995) (regulations governing plan loans to
participants).
156. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550A04c-l (1995) (regulations governing participant
directed investment of plan assets held in their accounts).
157. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1070 (1996).
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IV. PROPOSED MODEL OF THE LAW OF DIRECTED TRUSTEES
A. The Need For A Model
The conclusion that ERISA rejects the common law duty of independent
inquiry when the directed trustee acts at the direction of a non-participant plan
fiduciary does not answer the fundamental questions of: (1) what are the
fiduciary duties of a directed trustee under ERISA; and (2) how do the
fiduciary duties of a directed trustee differ from the duties of the directing
fiduciary? The model discussed below attempts to address these fundamental
questions by setting forth a theory reconciling the three key statutory
provisions under ERISA governing directed trustees and directing fiduciaries.
These sections are ERISA sections 403(a)(1), 404(a)(1), and 405(a).

B. Overview Of The Model
There are two basic concepts underlying the model. The first concept is
that ERISA's statutory scheme authorizes the allocation and delegation of
responsibilities among fiduciaries. 158 The model is designed to be consistent
with the statutory framework permitting the allocation and allegation of such
fiduciary responsibilities. The second concept underlying the model is the
well-established rule of statutory interpretation that specific statutory
provisions control over more general ones. 159 The model balances this rule
of statutory interpretation against other rules of statutory construction that an

158. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5038,5080-83; 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, FR-13-14.16 (1995). ERISA's rules governing
the allocation of fiduciary responsibilities are scattered throughout the statute. See 29
U.S.C. § 1102(b)(2) (1994) (plan shall describe any procedures for the allocation of
responsibilities for its operation and administration); 29 U.S.C. § 1102(c)(2)-(3) (1994)
(named plan fiduciary may designate persons to render advice with respect to
fiduciary's responsibilities or appoint investment manager to manage plan assets); 29
U.S.C. § 1105(b)(1)(B) (1994) (co-trustees may allocate specific duties by agreement
authorized in trust instrument); 29 U.S.C. § 1105(c)(I) (1994) (plan instrument may
provide for procedures allocating fiduciary responsibilities among named fiduciaries
and permitting named fiduciaries to designate other persons to carry out non-trustee
fiduciary duties under plan).
159. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1077 (1996); Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, 112 U.S. 2031, 2037 (1992) ("it is a commonplace of statutory
construction that the specific governs the general"); Busic v. United States, 446 U.S.
398,406 (1981); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1973); Hearn v. Western
Conference ofTeamsters Pension Fund, 68 F.3d 301, 304 (9th Cir. 1995) (construing
ERISA); United States v. LaPorta, 46 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 1994); Wetlands Water
Dist. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 43 F.3d 457, 461 (9th Cir. 1994).
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interpretation which gives effect to the entire statute and does not render part
of the statutory language superfluous l60 or lead to a result contrary to the
intent of the legislation is preferred. 161
The model places primary responsibility for compliance with the fiduciary
duties ofERISA section 404(a)(I) on the directing fiduciary, who must be the
"named fiduciary" under the plan. 162 Under ERISA's statutory scheme,
every plan must have at least one named fiduciary.163 In the hierarchy of
fiduciary responsibilities established by ERISA, the named fiduciary occupies
the position with the highest level of responsibility. The purpose of the
named fiduciary requirement is to focus with a degree of certainty the overall
responsibility for managing and operating the plan and the liability for its
mismanagement,l64 The named fiduciary may delegate his responsibilities
to another fiduciary, but only if such delegation of authority is authorized by
the terms of the plan. 165
In contrast to the directing fiduciary, under the model a directed trustee's
responsibilities are limited to the functions described by the specific language

160. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142 (1985)
(construing ERISA); United States Nat'l Bank v.lndependent Ins. Agents ofAmerica,
Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2173, 2182 (1993); Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 877
(1991); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990); Pennsylvania Dept. of
Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990); Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985); Hearn v. Western Conference
of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund 68 F.3d 301, 304 (9th Cir. 1995) (construing
ERISA); American Stores Co. v. American Stores Co. Retirement Plan, 928 F.2d 986,
990 (lOth Cir. 1991) (construing ERISA); Board of Trustees v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495,
504 (3rd Cir. 1992) (construing ERISA); United States v. Bacon, 21 F.3d 209, 212
(8th Cir. 1994).
161. See Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 217 (1984); Griffin v. Oceanic
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982); American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456
U.S. 63, 71 (1982).
162. Codified as amended at 29 U.s-.C. § 1103(a)(I) (1994).
163. 29 U.S.C. § l102(a)(I) (1994) (written instrument establishing ERISA plan
shall provide for one or more named fiduciaries).
164. See Birmingham v. Sagen-Swiss Int'l Corp. Retirement Plan, 718 F.2d 515,
522 (2d Cir. 1983); Arakeleian v. National W. Life Ins. Co., 680 F. Supp. 400, 404
(D.D.C. 1987); H.R. CONF. REp. No. 93-1280 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5038,5077-78,5081 (purpose ofrequirement that plan must identify named fiduciary
is so that plan participants will know who is responsible for managing and operating
the plan).
165. See 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(2) (1994) (plan shall describe any procedure for
the allocation of responsibilities for the operation and management of the plan); H.R.
CONF. REp. No. 93-1280 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 50781
(allocation or delegation of fiduciary responsibilities is allowed only if the plan
provides for it).
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ofERISA section 403(a)(l). The model takes the position that ERISA section
403(a)(l) establishes only two substantive criteria for directed trustees to use
in evaluating whether to follow the instructions ofthe non-participant directing
fiduciary. These two criteria require the directed trustee to determine if the
direction on its face is, first, in accordance with the terms of the plan, and
second, is not contrary to ERISA. If both of these substantive criteria are
satisfied, the direction is "proper" and the directed trustee may rely on the
direction. The directed trustee has no duty to independently inquire behind
or investigate the propriety of the direction to verify that the direction does
not violate the duties of the non-participant directing fiduciary under ERISA.
The model takes the position that the limited duties specifically pertaining
to a directed trustee under ERISA section 403(a)(l) control over the more
general fiduciary duties described in ERISA section 404(a)(l).166
Consequently, ERISA section 403(a)(l) makes some of the duties described
in section 404(a)(l) inapplicable to directed trustees, and restricts the
application of other ERISA section 404(a)(l) duties, in particular the duty of
prudence described in ERISA section 404(a)(l )(B), to the limited role of the
directed trustee described in ERISA section 403(a)(l).
Under the model, the directed trustee is liable for a breach of duty by the
directing fiduciary in making the direction if the directed trustee has actual
knowledge that the direction is a breach of duty by the directing fiduciary.
The directed trustee also is liable if he follows a direction which on its face
fails to satisfy the two substantive criteria of ERISA section 403(a)(l). The
directed trustee has no duty of independent inquiry, however, to detect and
prevent a breach of duty by the directing fiduciary. Consequently, the
directed trustee will not be liable for carrying out a facially valid direction
which in fact is a breach of duty by the directing fiduciary, absent actual
knowledge of such breach of duty.

C. The Relationship Between ERISA Sections 403(a)(I)
and 404(a) In The Directed Trustee Context
The model takes the position that the duties of a directed trustee are
determined by the specific language of ERISA section 403(a)(l). The general
fiduciary duties described in ERISA section 404(a) apply to a directed trustee
only to the limited extent of carrying out the directions of the directing
fiduciary. In contrast, the complete range of duties described in ERISA
section 404(a) would apply to the directing fiduciary in making the direction.

166. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1077 (1996) (rationale for the
canon of statutory construction that "the specific governs the general" is a warning
against applying a general provision when doing so would undermine the limitations
created by a more specific provision).
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Diagram 1 below illustrates the respective duties of the non-participant
directing fiduciary and the directed trustee.
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As a threshold matter, the model takes the position that ERISA section
404(a) applies, albeit in a limited fashion, to a directed trustee by virtue of the
trustee's status as a fiduciary. This position is consistent with the introductory
language of ERISA section 404(a)(I), which states: IISubject to Sections
403(c) and (d), 4042, and 4044, a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with
respect to a plan. . . .11167 The introductory language to ERISA section
404(a)(1) excludes subsections (c) and (d) of ERISA section 403, but does not
exclude subsection 403(a)(I), the "directed trustee subsection, thereby
indicating that ERISA section 404(a)(I) does apply to a directed trustee
because of the trustee's status as a fiduciary. This introductory language
limits the application of ERISA section 404(a), however, to the specific duties
carried out by the fiduciary. For a directed trustee, these duties are limited by
section 403(a)(1) to ascertaining whether the direction is in accordance with
the terms of the plan and is not contrary to ERISA. Diagram 2, below,
illustrates how the fiduciary responsibilities described in ERISA section 404(a)
should apply in a limited fashion to directed trustees.

167. Codified at 29 U.S.C. § l104(a)(I) (1994).
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DIAGRAM 2
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The directed trustee is subject to a limited duty of reasonable care under
ERISA section 404(a)(1)(B) by virtue ofthe nature of his specific duties under
ERISA section 403(a)(1). This limited duty of reasonable care requires the
directed trustee to decide if the direction on its face satisfies the two criteria
of ERISA section 403(a)(1) and, if so, to carry out the direction with the care
of a reasonable directed trustee under the circumstances. The directed trustee
is required to examine the direction on its face and determine, as a reasonable
directed trustee would, if the direction is in accordance with the terms of the
plan and is not contrary to the directing fiduciary's duties under ERISA
section 404(a)(l) and the other provisions of ERISA. This inquiry pursuant
to ERISA section 403(a)(1) incorporates the directed trustee's duty under
ERISA section 404(a)(1)(D) to "override" a direction made in accordancewith
the terms of the plan if following the direction would be contrary to
ERISA. 168 The directed trustee is not required (or even permitted) to
substitute his judgment for the discretionary judgment of the directing
fiduciary regarding the direction. In fact, under ERISA section 403(a)(1), the
directed trustee is required to follow the direction pursuant to the procedures

168. See AFL-CIO Letter, supra note 28 (trustee may follow terms of plan only
to the extent permitted by ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(D); Polaroid Letter, supra note 28
(same); CHH Letter, supra note 126 (if plan prescribes a course of action that is
inconsistent with ERISA, trustee cannot engage in that action).
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under the plan if the directed trustee reasonably determines that the direction
is in accordance with the terms of the plan and not contrary to ERISA. 169
Applying the objective standard of a reasonable directed trustee pursuant
to ERISA section 404(a)(1)(B) provides a measure of protection to the plan
participants against an erroneous decision by the directed trustee to follow a
direction which a reasonable directed trustee would have determined did not
meet the two criteria of ERISA section 403(a)(1). This construction is
consistent with judicial rulings interpreting ERISA section 404(a)(1)(B) that
a "pure heart and an empty head" are not enough to satisfy the fiduciary's
duty of reasonable care. 170
The limited duties of the directed trustee under ERISA section 403(a)(1)
render the remaining fiduciary duties under ERISA section 404(a)(1) only
indirectly applicable to the directed trustee in evaluating the direction given
by the directing fiduciary. These duties, specifically the duty to override the
direction pursuant to section 404(a)(1)(D) if the direction is contrary to
ERISA, apply to the directed trustee only to the extent that the directed trustee
must determine whether, based on the face of the direction, the directing
fiduciary has acted contrary to his ERISA section 404(a)(1) duties in issuing
the direction. Thus, the directed trustee must determine, under an objective
standard of a reasonable directed trustee, whether the direction on its face is
not contrary to the directing fiduciary's duties of loyalty, t7t prudence, 172
and prudent diversification,t73 the prohibited transaction rules, 174 and any
other applicable ERISA requirements. 175
The limited application of ERISA section 404(a)(1) in the directed trustee
context can be illustrated by example: recall the prior example of ABC
Company where the Administrative Committee directed Trust Company to
purchase High-Tech, Inc. stock. Assume that Trust Company purchased the
High-Tech, Inc. stock. The Administrative Committee now directs Trust
Company to sell the Plan's holdings of High-Tech, Inc. stock, which have
quadrupled in value. Trust Company must first decide whether the direction
on its face is in accordance with the terms of the Plan and is not contrary to
ERISA. Under the model, this determination is subject to the standard of a

169. See 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(I) (1994) (directed trustee shall be subject to
proper directions of other fiduciary).
170. See Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 (5th Cir. 1983), cer/.
denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984); Marshall v. Glass/Metal Ass'n & Glaziers &
Glassworkers Pension Plan, 507 F. Supp. 378, 384 (D. Haw. 1980).
171. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(I)(A) (1994).
172. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1994).
173. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(I)(C) (1994).
174. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106-07 (1994).
175. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(I)(D) (1994).
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reasonable directed trustee based on ERISA section 404(a)(1)(B). Although
Trust Company may believe that the stock should not be sold because the
stock price potentially could increase even more, Trust Company reasonably
determines that the direction on its face is not contrary to the Administrative
Committee's duties of loyalty, prudence and prudent diversification. The
direction on its face also is not contrary to ERISA's other provisions.
Having decided that the direction on its face satisfies the two criteria of
ERISA section 403(a)(1), Trust Company negligently delays executing the
direction to sell the High Tech, Inc. stock for a month, during which time the
price of the stock declines. Trust Company's failure prudently to carry out the
direction to sell the stock would be a violation of ERISA section 404(a)(1)(B),
and Trust Company would be liable to the Plan under ERISA section 409(a)
to restore the gains from the sale of the stock that were lost due to the delay
in executing the direction to sell.
The two points at which the directed trustee is subject to a reasonable
care standard under ERISA section 404(a)(l)(B), the review of the direction
for facial validity under ERISA section 403(a)(1) and the execution of a
facially valid direction, give a measure of protection to the plan participants.
Their real protection, however, lies in the directing fiduciary's compliance
with the full spectrum of duties described in ERISA section 404(a). It is the
directing fiduciary's responsibility to issue directions which comply with his
duties under section 404(a)(l) and which are not contrary to ERISA's other
requirements. If the directing fiduciary fails, he is the liable fiduciary under
ERISA's statutory scheme.
Such a result is consistent with ERISA's allocation of fiduciary
responsibilities and liabilities. 176 The Conference Report implicitly sanctions
this allocation of fiduciary liability.
[T]he plan may also provide that the trustee is to be subject to the direction
of named fiduciaries with respect to investment decisions. In this case, if
the trustee properly follows the instructions of the named fiduciaries, the
trustee generally is not to be liable for losses which arise out of following
these instructions. (The namedfiduciaries, however, would be subject to the
usual fiduciary responsibility rules and would be subject to liability on a
breach of these rules).177

176. See discussion and authorities cited supra notes 158, 162-65.
177. H.R. CONF. REp. No. 93-1280 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5038, 5082-83.
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D. Analysis Of The Standards OfLiability For A Discretionary
Fiduciary And A Directed Trustee Under ERISA Section 405
The starting point for the model's analysis of the liability of the directed
trustee for a breach of duty by the directing fiduciary is the language of
ERISA section 405(a), which states:
(a) In addition to any liability which he may have under any other provision
of this part, a fiduciary with respect to a plan shall be liable for a breach
offiduciary responsibility ofanother fiduciary with respect to the same plan
in the following circumstances:
(1) if he participates knowingly in, or knowingly undertakes to
conceal, an act or omission of such other fiduciary, knowing such act
or omission is a breach;
(2) if, by his failure to comply with section 404(a)(I) in the
administration of his specific responsibilities which give rise to his
status as a fiduciary, he has enabled such other fiduciary to commit a
breach; or
(3) ifhe has knowledge of a breach by such other fiduciary, unless he
makes reasonable efforts under the circumstances to remedy the
breach. J78

As a prerequisite to co-fiduciary liability, ERISA sections 405(a)(l) and
(3) require the directed trustee to have actual knowledge of the directing
fiduciary's breach of duty. This actual knowledge requirement is consistent
with ERISA section 405(b)'s exclusion of directed trustees from liability for
failure to reasonably prevent a co-fiduciary's breach of duty. ERISA section
405(b)(2), however, expressly states that nothing in section 405(b) limits any
liability a fiduciary may have under section 405(a).179 Under ERISA section
405(a)(1), if the directed trustee has -actual knowledge that a facially valid
direction is a breach of duty by the directing fiduciary, the directed trustee
will also be liable if he carries out the direction, an act of active participation
in the breach. For example, assume that Trust Company receives a facially
valid investment direction from the Administrative Committee to use the
proceeds from the sale of the High-Tech, Inc. stock to purchase 10,000 shares
of Company X. The President of ABC Company, who is one of the two
members ofthe Administrative Committee, tells Trust Company that he knows
that the Company X stock is a poor investment for the Plan. However, he

178. Codified at 29 U.S.C. § l105(a) (1994).
179. See 29 U.S.C. § l105(b)(2) (1994).
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personally has purchased 10,000 shares of Company X, and his personal share
ownership, when combined with the shares to be purchased by the ABC
Company Plan, will enable him to control fifty-one percent of Company X's
outstanding stock. Under these circumstances Trust Company potentially will
be liable under ERISA section 409(a) for any investment losses to the Plan if
it carries out the direction because Trust Company has actual knowledge that
at least one of the two members of the Administrative Committee has
breached his duty of loyalty under ERISA section 404(a)(1) in issuing the
direction for the Plan to purchase the Company X stock.
Under ERISA section 405(a)(3), even if the directed trustee does not
actively participate in the directing fiduciary's breach of duty, once the
directed trustee has actual knowledge of the directing fiduciary's breach of
duty, the directed trustee has an affirmative obligation to make "reasonable
efforts" under the circumstancesto remedy the breach. Subsection (3) is most
likely to come into play only in limited circumstances where the directed
trustee somehow learns that the directing fiduciary is engaged in a breach of
duty that does not involve a direction to the directed trustee. In such rare
circumstances, the PWBA has indicated that mere resignation in protest of the
directing fiduciary's conduct will not be sufficient to avoid co-fiduciary
liability under ERISA section 405(a)(3). The directed trustee may be required
to go so far as to seek an injunction against the directing fiduciary or notify
the PWBA of the violation. I so

180. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-5 FR-I0 Q&A (1995). This regulation describes
the steps that the minority group of trustees may be required to take in the event that
the majority group of trustees engages in conduct constituting a breach of fiduciary
duty:
FR-lO Q: An employee benefit plan is considering the construction
of a building to house the administration of the plan. One trustee has
proposed that the building be constructed on a cost plus basis by a
particular contractor without competitive bidding. When the trustee was
questioned by another trustee as to the basis of choice ofthe contractor, the
impact of the building on the plan's administrative costs, whether a cost
plus contract would yield a better price to the plan than a fixed price basis,
and why a negotiated contract would be better than letting the contract for
competitive bidding, no satisfactory answers were provided. Several ofthe
trustees have argued that letting such a contract would be a violation of
their general fiduciary responsibilities. Despite their arguments, a majority
of trustees appear to be ready to vote to construct the building as proposed.
What should the minority trustees do to protect themselves from liability
under section 409(a) of the Act and section 405(b)(1) of the Act?
A: Here, where a majority of trustees appear ready to take action
which would clearly be contrary to the prudence requirement of section
404(a)(I)(B) of the Act, it is incumbent on the minority trustees to take all
reasonable and legal steps to prevent the action. Such steps might include
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Once again, the status of the directed trustee as a fiduciary under ERISA
is critical to the integrated operation of ERISA's statutory scheme. As a nonfiduciary, a directed trustee would lack standing to bring a private civil action
under ERISA section 502 to enjoin the directing fiduciary's conduct. As a
fiduciary, a directed trustee could bring a private civil action to enjoin the
directing fiduciary's conduct, a course of conduct clearly contemplated as
possibly required under ERISA by the PWBA.
Subsection (2) of ERISA section 405(a) is the most difficult conceptually
to apply in the context of a directed trustee because it incorporates by
referencethe directed trustee's "specific responsibilities which give rise to his
status as a fiduciary" under ERISA section 404(a).J81 As discussed above,
the "specific responsibilities" of a directed trustee under ERISA section
404(a)(1) are limited by ERISA section 403(a)(1). Therefore, the model takes
the position that a directed trustee can only be liable under subsection (2) of
section 405(a) if the directed trustee acted imprudently in failing to determine
that the direction on its face did not satisfy the two criteria of ERISA section
403(a)(1) under the reasonable directed trustee standard of ERISA section
404(a)(1)(B). Such a failure would result in the directed trustee either
following a direction that was contrary to the terms of the plan, or following
a direction which, although in accordance with the terms of the plan, was

preparations to obtain an injunction from a Federal District court under
section 502(a)(3) ofthe Act, to notify the Labor Department, or to publicize
the vote if the decision is to proceed as proposed. If, having taken all
reasonable and legal steps to prevent the imprudent action, the minority
trustees have not succeeded, they will not incur liability for the action of
the majority. Mere resignation, however, without taking steps to prevent
the imprudent action, will not suffice to avoid liability for the minority
trustees once they have knowledge that the imprudent action is under
consideration.
More generally, trustees should take great care to document adequately
all meetings where actions are taken with respect to management and
control of plan assets. Written minutes of all actions taken should be kept
describing the action taken, and stating how each trustee voted on each
matter. If, as in the case above, trustees object to a proposed action on the
grounds of possible violation of the fiduciary responsibility provisions of
the Act, the trustees so objecting should insist that their objections and the
responses to such objections be included in the record of the meeting. It
should be noted that, where a trustee believes that a cotrustee has already
committed a breach, resignation by the trustee as a protest against such
breach will not generally be considered sufficient to discharge the trustee's
positive duty under section 405(a)(3) to make reasonable efforts under the
circumstances to remedy the breach.
(emphasis added).
181. Codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § l105(a)(2) (1994).
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contrary to ERISA. In either situation, the directed trustees' conduct in
following the direction would result in a breach of fiduciary duty under
ERISA section 404(a)(I)(D).

v. CONCLUSION
Directed trustees play an important role in the management and
administration of employee benefit plans under ERISA. A directed trustee's
status as a fiduciary under ERISA ensures that the plan participants will be
able to redress a breach of fiduciary duty by the directed trustee through the
federal courts. The fiduciary duties of a directed trustee, however, are limited
by ERISA section 403(a)(I). The directed trustee's limited fiduciary
responsibility is consistent with ERISA's statutory scheme permitting the
allocation of fiduciary responsibilities and liabilities.
Recent judicial decisions concerning directed trustees depart from the
principle that a directed trustee is a fiduciary under ERISA, but with
statutorily limited fiduciary duties. By incorporating the rules for directed
trustees developed under the cornmon law into ERISA, these decisions
simultaneously overburden the directed trustee when acting at the direction of
a non-participant plan fiduciary while failing to provide adequate protection
to the plan participants when they are the ones providing directions to the
trustee.
This article rejects a literal incorporation of the common law of trusts
into ERISA in the context of directed trustees. The article proposes that
where the directed trustee acts at the direction of the plan participants, the
degree of deference that a directed trustee must afford the direction will vary
depending upon the context and the particular safeguards built into ERISA and
its implementing regulations for situations involving participant directions.
When the directed trustee acts at the direction of a non-participant plan
fiduciary, principles of general application governing the duties of the directed
trustee can be derived from ERISA's statutory provisions in a manner that is
consistent with the statute's legislative history and remedial purposes.
Part IV of this article proposes an analytical model of the duties under
ERISA of a directed trustee who acts at the direction of a non-participant plan
fiduciary. The model addresses a theoretical void in the law and the scholarly
literature by reconciling the three key statutory sections of ERISA which
govern the duties of directed trustees and directing fiduciaries. The design of
the model is consistent with ERISA's statutory scheme allocating and
delegating responsibilities among fiduciaries while harmonizing ERISA's
various statutory provisions governing directed trustees.
Directed trustees of employee benefit plans subject to ERISA are
responsible for the custody of plan assets worth billions of dollars. ERISA
was enacted in part because the law developed under the common law of
trusts was deemed inadequate in the areas of fiduciary responsibility for
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employee benefit plan assets and remedies for injured plan participants.
ERISA's statutory scheme reflects a careful balancing of fiduciary
responsibilities and protections for plan participants designed for the unique
context of employee benefit plans. Recent federal court decisions have
undermined this statutory scheme by incorporating into ERISA principles
developed under the common law of trusts in order to determine the fiduciary
status and duties of directed trustees. Federal courts faced with directed
trustee issues in the future should reconsider the reasoning of the FirsTier
Bank and Maniace decisions in light of ERISA's statutory language and
remedial purposes. This article provides a blueprint for such reconsideration.

